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Courier-Mail (Brisbane), 22-23 April 2006

Asians Fuel Discontent

Corruption lies behind this week’s events in the Solomons, writes Clive Moore

Waku is the Solomon Islands Pijin English name for the increasingly diverse local Asian community, who play a crucial role in the Solomon Islands economy. They are involved in corruption and have been behind the scenes in the political process since the late 1980s.

The devastation that has occurred in Honaira, the capital city of the Solomon Islands, has been targeted at the Chinese, but the underlying tension is much wider, and included large-scale corrupt business practices by Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese and Malaysian companies as well as the local Chinese.

The April national election and Waku manipulations threw fuel on smouldering resentment that predates Independence in 1978. The result has been explosive and far worse in its intensity than the original ‘tension’ of 1998-2003.

The first Chinese settlers arrived as tradesmen during the 1920s, and then set up ‘Chinatown’ commercial settlements at Tulagi, Honiara and Gizo.

They still control much of the retail trade in the country, and remain quite dominant in Honiara and in the main provincial towns.

The Chinese community began to integrate into colonial society in the 1950s and 1960s, adopting Christianity, establishing a Chinese-language school, taking out British citizenship and deliberately becoming part of Solomon Islands society.

The years around Independence were a period of uncertainty about their future welcome but many families stuck it out and have prospered, becoming leading hoteliers and owning a wide range of businesses.

Then, during the 1990s a significant number of new Chinese settled in the Solomon Islands, adding to the already established Chinese community.

The old Waku families are well-established and integrated into urban society; many have married indigenous Solomon Islanders while still maintaining their cultural core and networks.

Only two old Waku families have gone into politics: the Chan family of Chinese origin, and the Sato family, of Japanese origin. A Chinese accountant, Robert Goh, has had considerable influence as an adviser to the government of Sir Alan Kemakeza government (2001-06).

The destruction and torching of the Chinese-owned Pacific Casino hotel on Honiara’s foreshore may well have been partly because Robert Goh had his office there. His house was also burnt down in the riots.

These old Chinese families form a bridge between the established Asian community, indigenous Solomon Islanders and the new Waku, mainland Chinese and Malaysian Chinese who by dint of hard work and subterfuge rapidly incorporated themselves into the economy and grafted themselves onto the old Waku community.

The full extent of illegal Waku practices beyond formal business dealings is unclear. Over the previous twenty years an unhealthy relationship has developed between the Waku and various Governments, particularly those connected to Solomon Mamaloni.

In October 2005 two audit reports were presented to Parliament, one on forestry and one on fishing, both major industries. The total domestic revenue in 2004 was S$497 million, 36.3 per cent higher than in 2003, largely because of greater taxation compliance. The two audit reports estimate that at the very least over S$80 million that should have ended up in Consolidated Revenue during the early 2000s has been skimmed off by corrupt Solomon Islanders or has been not been paid by the foreign companies concerned. The companies names are participating in the corrupt practices are all Asian, mainly Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese and Malaysian.

The reports are not comprehensive and it seems likely that even more money is involved, and while the two Departments are important, there are many more, plus the provinces, yet to be audited, and then there are the lucrative exemptions to excise duty and aid money skimmed off over the last five years. The real dollar value of the corrupt practices is hundreds of millions of dollars.

The Regional Assistance Mission (RAMSI) has the unenviable task of guiding a suitable reform process for the nation. The Regional Mission has restored law and order and was dealing with prosecutions of the ‘big fish’ while strengthening the public service and the economy. No one saw the events of this week coming.

There are valid criticisms of the method and rationale of RAMSI, which has concentrated on institutional strengthening. Development issues have not been tackled directly enough, as they were seen as the business of the Government.

All that the election achieved was a changing of the seats of the leaders, placing the Deputy Prime Minister, tainted from his years as Minister for Finance, into the role of Prime Minister, backed by Chinese money.

Clive Moore is an associate professor with the School of History, Philosophy, Religion and Classics at the University of Queensland and the President of the Australian Association for the Advancement of Pacific Studies. He is the author of Happy Isles in Crisis: The Historical Causes for a Failing State in Solomon Islands, 1998-2004

Observations from Malaita

A few reflections and bits of news from Terry Brown, Bishop of Malaita (thanks Terry!)...

Note that these are not necessarily the opinions of the blog owners, as we haven't been there on the ground - we simply find Terry's commentary very interesting!!

(1) A contingent of 10 RAMSI military (New Zealanders for sure, possibly others) have arrived in Auki. Yesterday they patrolled the streets of downtown Auki in full battle gear, fully armed. Obviously the full show of force is to make people think twice about causing any disturbance, especially at night. The last two nights have been quiet. In the end up to 16 were arrested in the Auki disturbance on Wednesday night. One Chinese shop (the one I mentioned in a previous update) was broken into and goods stolen. The owner and some of our other "new" Chinese fled to Honiara on Thursday morning. All the Chinese stores remain closed, although we are urging them to re-open as soon as possible. Of course, they are affected by events in Honiara. My impression is that the Honiara rioters distinguished between "old" and "new" Chinese buildings (QQQ in Chinatown was untouched), so our "old" Chinese stores in Auki may be in better shape than others. Long term though, Langa Langa vs. Chinese business rivalry in Auki will continue, and there will always be some in the former community who would like the latter simply to disappear. But Auki and Malaita are a big market, and there should be enough room for everyone. Banks finally re-opened and what little rice is still available has taken a big leap in price. Today's Saturday morning market is going ahead full force as though nothing had happened (no RAMSI presence). The only difference is that the two or three large ships that usually come from Honiara Friday night have not arrived -- obviously stopped by the police/RAMSI to prevent loot flowing out to the provinces (one load arrived yesterday) and gawkers and would-be rioters flowing into Honiara. As rural Malaitans have had their ears to the radio all last week (the FM station used its "call in" system to report the location of the mob and their arson and looting, while SIBC reported very little), many have come to Auki hoping to go to Honiara today to see the sights.

The Asian road workers on the Asian Development Bank-funded Kitano Malaita road-building project were also evacuated. It remains unclear to me why the ADB/Kitano has imported road workers from Cambodia and the Philippines to rebuild Malaita's roads (some sort of internal Asian agenda, I suppose), as though we don't have people in Malaita who can build roads. This is part of the feeling that everyone but Solomon Islanders are somehow making a profit out of our troubles (including, of course, all the NGOs, RAMSI advisors, consultants, volunteers, etc.).

(2) As far as Honiara events are concerned, the "spark" that sent the rioters into central Honiara from Parliament, the use of tear gas by the Australian RAMSI contingent against the crowd around Parliament who were becoming rowdy after the announcement of Snyder Rini's election, needs to be investigated. The Speaker of Parliament and leaders of the parties were apparently preparing to address the crowd and calm them down (the exact same rowdiness developed after the announcement of Allan Kemakeza's election as PM five years ago but was dissipated) when, apparently unannounced and without warning, the RAMSI tear gas hit. Sir Peter has complained about this on the Australian media and others have picked it up. It is cited as an example of Australian RAMSI's over-reaction to events that look like they might turn violent. All through the riots, the use of tear gas only inflamed and increased the crowds.

(3) The rioting and looting crowds were made up of people from all provinces, including some women and children. While Robert Wale, the leader of the so-called "People Power" movement is from Malaita (Langa Langa), participation was from all provinces and it would be wrong to see the rioting as some sort of continuation of a Malaita Eagle Force plot. The rumors that Edmund Sae, for example, is in Honiara leading the troops are, I am fairly certain, untrue. (I am afraid he has acquired a Jon Frum-like persona in these kinds of events.) Robert Wale, it should be said, is not exactly a Corazon Aquino. He is a former member of the Honiara Town Council and his record there was not especially clean. I am sure that he must have lost out in some of the land deals that saw so much of Honiara's prime sea front land sold to the Chinese by dubious means. I would think Wale would/should be arrested down the line, for incitement to riot. His media pronouncements are taking a high moral road but his record does not especially justify it.

(4) Honiara people have never liked the Australian RAMSI contingent. Most people distinguish between the Australian RAMSI (whom they don't like) and the New Zealand and Pacific Islands RAMSI (whom they do like). The general feeling is that the RAMSI motto "Helpim fren" doesn’t hold much water when the Australian RAMSI are so sullen and hostile, won't even say hello, speed up and down the streets without regard for the other traffic, won't allow the use of RAMSI helicopters and planes for humanitarian purposes, and hang out at all the expensive Chinese restaurants (some of them now destroyed, such as the Fortune Restaurant in the Pacific Casino Hotel complex) and the Green Mango and won't go near local eateries or the central market. (I heard a story yesterday that, indeed, RAMSI assisted financially Patrick Leong in the completion of the construction of the Pacific Casino Hotel, to house its personnel. It certainly has never attracted overseas tourists the way the hotels with casinos do in Vanuatu. The story needs to be checked out. There are also lots of stories about PCH being a centre of prostitution, which may well have involved RAMSI personnel. The "evacuation" of the Pacific Casino Hotel's "guests" by boat may well have been simply the evacuation of RAMSI personnel from the hotel.) I have always wondered if there was any money laundrying involved in all the new Chinese developments.)

So, for many reasons, the alliance of the (1) Kemekeza/Rini (corrupt) government, (2) the extensive and expensive Chinese commercial developments in Honiara, from before "ethnic tension", then interrupted, then resumed, while ordinary local Honiara people get poorer and poorer as the prices at the Chinese shops go up and up, and (3) RAMSI, friend of the Kemakeza/Rini government and the Chinese, (perceived as) hostile to Malaitans, unfriendly Australians, etc, etc. -- all united together in the riots. I have heard that 15 RAMSI vehicles were destroyed, not to mention the Pacific Casinos' entire rent-a-car fleet, 20 RAMSI injured (one sent back to Australia for serious jaw injuries from a stone). I am told that Reef Islanders can shoot a RAMSI helicopter with a stone. There were some failures of RAMSI intelligence -- half of Solomon Islanders are saltwater people and it is a bit inconceivable that the sea side of the Pacific Casino Hotel was left unprotected.

The properties (commercial, offices, residences) of the Kemekeza/Rini government's Chinese advisors and backers (for example, Tommy Chan, Robert Goh, Patrick Leong) were particularly targeted for destruction. The Honiara Hotel (Tommy Chan) has its own security and has survived, though there were rumours of an attack from over the hill behind the hotel. There were also rumours that the Mendana Hotel was on the hit list.

None of what I have written above is intended to condone or support the rioting. It is tragic, both for the individuals involved (on all sides) and for the country. For the Solomons claiming to be a "Christian country", it is a travesty of the Easter message, as church leaders have pointed out in pastoral statements. But legitimate frustrations are there and people explode. Alas, we are now producing refugees, with 400 Chinese living at the Police Club at Rove under police/RAMSI security.

(5) The new Prime Minister's media statements that the rioting had no political motivation and was simply criminal activity rather boggle the mind, although obviously those with non-political motives joined in for the free loot.

Despite the demands of Robert Wale and the "People Power" movement, I think the considered view of all members of Parliament, premiers, church leaders, diplomatic community, is that Parliament should meet and that any attempt to oust Rini as Prime Minister should be done constitutionally. In many respects, the announced cabinet contains some very good people, such as Fred Fono, the Deputy Prime Minister. Forcing a PM to resign by public protests, when he has been constitutionally elected (despite corruption), sets rather a bad precedent, such that every future election will face the same problem and the same hope by the losing party. If there were substantial bribes made (whether accepted or not) by the Rini camp and Tommy Chan, as Opposition leader Billy Hilly maintains, then the matter should be reported to the police; but whether the police and RAMSI have the wherewithal and will to follow up on and investigate these claims remains to be seen.

One issue in all of this is the extent to which Australia has interfered in the parliamentary process in the Solomons. For example, Fred Fono, the well-respected Malaita MP who for several years was a strong member of the Opposition, crossed over to the Kemekeza government a couple years ago to everyone's surprise. When accosted by his supporters about this, he maintained that he was asked to do this by the British and Australian High Commissions to give financial and administrative stability to the Kemakeza government to enable EC STABEX funds to be transferred. He is now the new Deputy Prime Minister, set to take over if Rini is dumped. If this story is true, it is another example of the diplomatic community's short-, rather than long-term thinking. Between this kind of interference and RAMSI, the SI risk becoming an Australian puppet state (at least that is the perception, though, of course, Australia and RAMSI strongly deny it) -- but, as last week's events show, it is hard to control all the people who feel that they are part of a puppet state (whether it is a puppet state or not), especially as the conditions of their economic life go down and down, and those perceived as pulling the strings and their helpers seem to get richer and richer.

(5) The arrival of a PNG police contingent begs many questions. I wonder if it is even in Australia's best interest, as PNG RAMSI personnel are well known for complaining about Australia, and only help to fan anti-Australian sentiment within RSIP and the communities where they serve. I am told that one of the first lots of PNG RAMSI personnel (when RAMSI first arrived) were sent home fast after they set up a prostitution ring. But PNG RAMSI personnel are liked much more than Australian RAMSI; they are fellow Pacific Islanders.

(6) To RAMSI's credit, there has been no firing on crowds, though I am sure many would have liked to have, given the barrage of stones. Had this been many other parts of the world, there would have been deaths. Unfortunately, the crowds also probably took advantage of the knowledge that RAMSI would not shoot *at* them. However, a core question remains why a multinational intervention force and the local police force it is supposed to be training and advising, led by a nation with high technology and unlimited financial resources, good communication and transport, and numerous advisors and consultants, were not able to anticipate and control (and, indeed, may have provoked) a small demonstration that got out of hand, not bringing in reinforcements very early (as RAMSI said they could when most military personnel left the country), not containing the demonstrators very early, not acting decisively in any way -- resulting eventually in a scale of damage, personal and material, immensely beyond anything that resulted from the "ethnic tension" crisis. "Helpim fren" has turned into "Spoilim fren". Is RAMSI only "rapid response" (late) after crisis, quick withdrawal, self-satisfaction, confusion when a new crisis comes, then another (late) "rapid response"? Of course, it is easy to criticize after the fact. Even veteran ABC reporter Sean Dorney had left for Australia after covering the elections and did not anticipate such events. Nor can I say I anticipated them, though I have long thought and said that anti-Chinese riots were always a possibility. I think most people anticipated that the "Grand Coalition of Parties" had enough votes to win and did not realize the capacity of the two "old" groupings usually in opposition to one another to band together to defeat it.

I think the road ahead will continue to be rocky. Australia and RAMSI need independently to assess where they now are, and not just uncritically back the elected government, whose mandate is weak indeed. (Such a consultation and assessment should be done with real Solomon Islands organizations on the ground -- such as churches and community groups, rather than by highly paid outside advisors. Even RAMSI's own consultation has been defective, very short and rushed visits and a quick exit when the difficult questions begin to be asked.) One only wishes that RAMSI could get away from its constant defensiveness -- that it is always right and does nothing wrong -- and admit to its mistakes, and not engage in constant self-promotion, which has now royally backfired. I think all would do well to back off a bit, rather than constant tinkering and interference -- courting favourite members of the government or opposition, insisting on an Australian Police Commissioner, producing an ever-creasing number of advisors (also travelling by helicopter), etc. The riots are a reassertion of Solomon Islands sovereignty, which has been significantly eroded in the past few years, though, unfortunately, it apparently takes a common enemy to unite all Solomon Islanders. On the other hand, the RAMSI presence is still needed, I would say -- particularly if parliamentary government is to continue -- as the alternatives (as last week's events show) are also not very attractive. But the future economic effects on the country of last week's events, at least short term, are grave and it will take much effort to keep things on a steady keel.

Does a rights-based approach make a difference? The role of public law in vulnerability reduction

Handmer, John, and Rebecca Monson, "Does a Rights Based Approach Make a Difference? The Role of Public Law in Vulnerability Reduction," International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters, Vol. 22, No. 3 (November 2004): 43-59.

ABSTRACT

Reducing the impact of climate-related disasters can be conceptualised as being about reducing or managing ‘vulnerability’. ‘Vulnerability’ is a multi-faceted concept incorporating issues of livelihood, housing, security and gender among many others. For example, groups of people may be more or less vulnerable to climate-related disasters due to the security of their livelihoods or the quality of their housing. Social norms and custom, international law, and national public and private law may regulate these constituents of vulnerability. In some jurisdictions, such as countries in the European Union and the Council of Europe, and countries with new constitutions, there is a range of specific rights that may be mobilised to reduce vulnerability.

Much of the work on the link between vulnerability reduction and human rights focuses on international law. However national law is generally more accessible and enforceable than international conventions, no matter how attractive the conventions may seem. National public law is of particular value to vulnerability reduction because governments are often those with the clearest responsibilities and the greatest resources for reducing vulnerability. We draw on three recent South African cases to illustrate the potential for citizens to mobilise public law to reduce their own vulnerability:

• In the case of Minister of Public Works & Ors v Kyalami Ridge Environmental Association & Anor [2001] ICHRL 33 (29 May 2001), the Court found a constitutional obligation to provide disaster relief, and established that when administrative action is taken to address the plight of victims of disaster, it will not necessarily be a denial of natural justice to fail to provide a hearing to all those who object to the emergency measures.

• In the 2001 decision of Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others (2001) (1) SA 46 (CC); 2000(11) BCLR 1169 (CC), the South African Constitutional Court was required to consider the scope of s.26 of the South African Constitution, which provides that everyone has the right of access to adequate housing.

• A later case, Minister of Health and others v Treatment Action Campaign and others (2002) (5) SA 721; 2002 (10) BCLR 1033; [2002] ZACC 15 (5 July 2002), is of great significance to the attempt to combat HIV/AIDs. In that case, the South African Constitutional Court ruled that the government had a constitutional obligation to provide HIV treatment to pregnant women to help prevent transmission of the virus to their unborn children.
  

We also briefly examine the potential role of the European Court of Human Rights in reducing vulnerability through the enforcement of the law common to the Council of Europe. Finally, we raise the question of whether a rights-based approach might be effective in countries without mechanisms similar to those in South Africa and the Council of Europe.

Insecure livelihoods, transitional economies and identity: rioting in the Solomon Islands

This piece was written for distribution to mass media in Australia, and is posted here to promote discussion - we realise it isn't the whole story (that's not possible in 1500 words!)

CIVIL SECURITY REQUIRES ECONOMIC SECURITY

by Rebecca Monson and Wei Choong

Rioting in Honiara is not simply evidence of ongoing instability in the Solomon Islands, but of the powerful collision between conflict, governance, and the struggle for peaceful and secure livelihoods.

Recent crises in Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Bougainville, and Solomon Islands have provoked concern about the rise of “ethnic conflict” in Melanesia, referred to in the Australian media as the “arc of instability”. From 1998-2003 Solomon Islands was plagued by conflict popularly known as "the Tensions", that resulted in the death of hundreds of Solomon Islanders, the internal displacement of tens of thousands more, and the destruction of the country’s narrow economic base. While the causes of the conflict are complex, the primary protagonists were the Malaitans and the indigenous inhabitants of Guadacanal, the island on which the national capital, Honiara, is based. Europeans arrived in the Solomons in the late 1800s, bringing with them the cash economy, and inhabitants of other islands began to migrate to Guadacanal in search of work. Migration of Malaitans escalated during World War II when the United States brought labourers from Malaita, the most populous nation in the Solomons chain, to work on Guadacanal. Large numbers of migrants from other islands were attracted to Guadalcanal by the prospect of employment offering a cash income, leading to competition for land and jobs. Customary land on Guadalcanal was sold to people from other islands, creating a source of conflict because of the strong relationship between people’s social allegiances and land. Younger Guale people were dispossessed of their inheritance, but rather than blaming those who sold the land, their anger has been directed primarily against Malaitans, who achieved dominant positions in the economy. Guadalcanalese people often describe Malaitan settlements established on an agreed lease as “like mushrooms”, with successive generations squatting around an original lease. This resulted in a build up of tensions over time, which successive governments failed to address. The Tensions began in 1998 when Guadacanalese militants embarked upon a campaign of intimidation intended to chase settlers off Guadacanal. While ethnicity and cultural differences played a role in the Tensions, the roots of the conflict also lie in competition for limited resources and strong ties to land in a transitional economy.

The recent rioting in Honiara also has an ethnic dimension, evidenced by the targeting of Chinese businesses in looting, and in the torching of buildings in Chinatown. But this is not about racism - it is about what happens when cultural identity collides with anger about entrenched corruption in government and limited access to resources. While the elections ran smoothly, the old powers – surrounded as they are by allegations of corruption - returned to the helm. The man elected PM, Snyder Rini, is thought to have both Chinese and Taiwanese links – protestors say that his coalition Government is funded and influenced by the owner of the Honiara Hotel, Sir Thomas Chan. During the election campaign, Solomon Islands media reported of complaints regarding the Asian influence over the political process. On Tuesday night the rioting spread from Honiara on Guadacanal to Auki on the neighbouring island of Malaita, where a gang of youths shot stones at a RAMSI vehicle and a Chinese store. The excuse for rioting in Auki was that the “waku (Chinese) supported candidate” won the election for PM.

The Chinese began to arrive in Solomon Islands in the early 20^th century, originally in search of trading ventures and then later as labour for the British protectorate. They established a quasi-local economy of small general stores located in Honiara, and supply the local people with basic goods as well as employment. They developed and maintained the cash economy, and continue to control it today. Yet analysts have paid little attention to the place of the Chinese in Solomons society. Our research confirms that there are mixed feelings among the Melanesians about the Chinese. There are feelings of envy and bitterness towards the Chinese community for their economic clout and wealth accumulation, yet during the Tensions the Chinese were not targeted by militants and were acknowledged by senior Ministers for their commitment to the country by keeping their businesses operating in spite of rising violence.

Chinese business interests and political agendas are intertwined, but the situation s complex. Solomon Islands is a nation of incredible cultural diversity and lacks any economic distribution mechanism to ensure that its scarce resources are available to all. There are differing perceptions of productivity and the value of goods and services. More importantly, there is differing access to the cash economy which is now essential to survival. Very few Melanesians own their own businesses, most work for the Chinese. Since most Melanesians can no longer choose to remain outside the cash economy, they are confronted with the differing culture and economic power of the Chinese. The losing side to the PM's race decided to play the race card, igniting decades of bitterness. Locals are now worried about “stage two” in the ethnic tensions – instead of Guadacanalese versus Malaitan, there may now be Melanesians versus Chinese.

There is definitely an element of hooliganism to the rioting, as there was to the Tensions, but this hooliganism is linked also to resource distribution and use. Nowhere is this more obvious than among young people. Issues such as poverty, drug and alcohol abuse, teenage pregnancy, illiteracy and limited access to activities and services are widespread among youth and contribute to the disaffection among young people that maintains the risk of future conflict. The Solomons Island has one of the highest growing populations in the world, a collapsed (or collapsing) economy, a culture that increases the likelihood of young people being shunned from participation in community affairs, limited access to formal education, and a sense among young people that they are ‘being left out’. These conditions are thought to be the type that lead to, or increase the likelihood of, armed conflict.

Solomon Islanders across all age groups regularly describe young people as suffering form boredom, lack of direction, aimlessness and low self-esteem arising from the marginal participation of youth and women in community decision-making, which is the preserve of older males. This is reinforced by a sense of failure due to the high value placed on formal education, which the vast majority of rural people have limited access to due to geographic isolation and limited finances. Associated with the emphasis on formal education is the increased importance of the cash economy, because even in remote areas such as the Weathercoast, where the informal subsistence economy is far greater than the formal cash economy, cash is required to pay school fees. The formal education system reinforces the importance of the cash economy, because respondents routinely described it as training people “to be employees, not employers”, and without enough emphasis on the vocational education and training that would facilitate the establishment of small businesses and enterprises. Limited access to microcredit facilities provides further limits on opportunities for self-employment. There is also limited financial support and a lack of activities available for young people who are not in formal education or employment.

The emphasis on formal education and the need for cash, as well as the lack of youth activities, encourages migration of people from rural areas to urban areas. This is particularly the case among youth – many respondents described how young people from rural villages “are attracted to the bright lights of Honiara”. However unemployment appears to be high in Honiara, and the issues that young people seek to escape from rural life – lack of community participation, poverty, limited youth activities – exist in Honiara also. Respondents described the sense among youth that they “have no future”. This context provided a breeding ground for the growth of frustration and resentment among youth, and in this context it was not particularly difficult to mobilise youth. Young people have described how during the early stages of the Tensions, fighting was exciting, it provided a cause for young people to believe in. All of a sudden they had something to do and something to believe in. One young person described how, "at the time it was just exciting, and I was angry with them for stealing our land. I didn't know what would happen. I didn't know what bad things would happen." Ironically, the situation of young people is worse in the aftermath of the Tensions than before. The formal/cash economy largely collapsed during the Tensions, and while starting to recover, the opportunity for income generation remains limited. Poverty and aimlessness finds no relief through traditional village structures, and the situation is exacerbated by poor access to education and high illiteracy rates.

The rioting, like the Tensions, brings the consequences of cultural differences and tension over minimal resources into sharp focus. The increased immigration of Chinese and their economic success in Solomon Islands only reinforces the sense among Melanesians of being at the bottom of the economic heap in their own homelands. There is a limit to what Australian security forces can achieve. As is the case throughout the world, there will be no chance for real improvements in civil security unless the sources of insecurity are acknowledged not only by the country and its people, but by the bilateral aid donors.

The Indian Ocean Tsunami: an Act of God, or manufactured by mortals?

The article below was published in Harambee 51, March 2005, entitled 'Disasters: Out of our hands?'.

Harambee is an excellent publication produced by Tear Australia and available from their website (http://www.tear.org.au/). I highly recommend this entire issue, as well as an issue of Tear's other publication, Target - Target No. 2, 2005, 'When Disaster Strikes'.

‘Natural’ disasters: Acts of God, or manufactured by mortals?

by Rebecca Monson

In the days following the Indian Ocean tsunami, two explanations for the tragedy were given coverage by the Australian media. The first was that the disaster was solely the result of ‘nature’, via the movement of tectonic plates. The second was that the tsunami was somehow an ‘Act of God’. Neither of these explanations is particularly helpful in preventing and responding to disasters, as both deny the role that humans play in compounding the damage that natural events cause to families, communities and the environment.

The events that we call ‘disasters’ are never purely ‘natural’, but arise from the interaction of natural events with human societies. For instance, a tsunami occurring in an uninhabited region, or a flood occurring over rice paddies, would not be called a ‘disaster’, but merely a natural event. Whether or not a natural event becomes something we call a ‘disaster’ is determined by the social, cultural, economic and political conditions existing in the area hit by an event. Efforts to prepare for, mitigate the effects of, and respond to a disaster must therefore be based on understanding both the natural event and the social, environmental, and economic conditions that shape the effects of that event.

‘Vulnerability’ has emerged as a key concept for understanding the conditions that enable a natural event to become a ‘disaster’. Broadly speaking, ‘vulnerability’ refers to the likelihood that people will experience damage, loss and suffering as a result of a natural event. Class, caste, ethnicity, occupation, gender, disability, health status, and age are factors that can influence vulnerability, because people who are disadvantaged by one or more of these characteristics are more likely to suffer from a natural disaster. In India, for example, Dalits (so-called untouchables, or low caste people) appear to be amongst the most vulnerable in the aftermath of the tsunami. NGOs and journalists have reported that members of higher-caste communities are preventing Dalits from accessing relief camps, and government officials have refused to provide water, food and shelter to them.[i]

Poverty is not synonymous with vulnerability, but the two conditions tend to be highly correlated. The poor often live in unsafe locations, and have fragile health and livelihoods. This makes them more vulnerable, because their ability to cope with the additional burdens arising from a natural event is limited. In Sri Lanka, India and Indonesia, poor fishing families had been forced to build their houses closer to the coastline due to the construction of resorts, hotels and highways. Due to their limited finances, these houses were weak structures that were unable to withstand the force of the tsunami. As a result many fishermen lost their homes and all their belongings, including their means for earning a living. Since most are without savings or insurance, their ability to reconstruct their livelihoods is limited. By contrast, concrete hotels were far more likely to withstand the tsunami. Furthermore, even in areas where virtually everything was destroyed, hotel owners had insurance and overseas investments to enable them to restore damage.

Poverty is also often associated with limited access to infrastructure and services, which is a key cause of vulnerability. While the location of Aceh at the epicentre of the earthquake and tsunami meant that severe destruction was inevitable, the effects were exacerbated by the fact that it is one of the poorest provinces in Indonesia, and the scene of protracted civil conflict. Prior to the tsunami, roads were poor, electrical services were erratic, and schools and hospitals were poorly equipped. Physical infrastructure was already prone to disruption before the tsunami, and was completely shattered by this additional assault. Disaster response has also been hampered because development agencies have been prohibited from working in Aceh for several years, and therefore lack the local structures and expertise that facilitate swift and effective action. Thus while the sheer force of the Indian Ocean tsunami would probably have triggered a disaster wherever it occurred, the scope of the disaster would have been greatly reduced if it hit the north-east coast of the North America. In many respects, the tsunami was simply the latest blow to people already struggling to survive.

This is not to say that those who are vulnerable are completely helpless, or even that someone who is poor will always be more vulnerable than someone who is wealthy. In the South Pacific, local knowledge of tsunamis ensures that local people know to run for the hills if the tide goes out too far. Foreign tourists, although wealthy, generally lack this knowledge (there are exceptions – in Phuket, a 10 year-old British girl triggered the evacuation of a beach when she realised a tsunami was coming). In Thailand, meditation skills have increased the capacity of Buddhist monks to cope with cremating tsunami victims.[ii] Agencies involved in relief efforts must be aware of these local capacities, in order to ensure that they are strengthened rather than weakened. Good relief offers a chance to tap local knowledge and strengthen livelihoods - following the 2001 earthquake in Gujarat, local architects and engineers drew inspiration from the traditional houses when designing new, earthquake-resistant dwellings, because unlike many modern houses, these traditional dwellings had survived the earthquake.[iii]

While nature might be involved, the events that we call ‘disasters’ are not purely ‘natural’, nor are they ‘Acts of God’. They arise from the interaction of a natural event with the social, environmental, economic conditions that humans create. If disaster relief and reconstruction fails to address the long-term conditions creating vulnerability, the poor remain caught in a vicious cycle of repeated disasters and emergency aid.

Although this fact is increasingly acknowledged, very little is being done. In fact, disaster ‘aid’ often promotes this cycle – much of the aid to countries affected by the tsunami is in the form of loans, and foreign debt is often a key cause of vulnerability, because it leads to budget cuts to areas such as health and education. Furthermore, while countries such as Australia spend millions on reducing the risks associated with floods, droughts and bushfires, very little is spent on assisting poor communities to do the same. This leads to some cruel ironies. In 2000, Mozambique appealed to the international community for $2.7 million to prepare for flooding, and received less than half this amount. 3 months later, more than $100 million of emergency aid poured into the country after it was struck by flooding, and a further $450 million was pledged for rehabilitation costs.[iv] Similarly, an NGO in Indonesia reports that they prepared booklets entitled “Tsunami! Kisah tentang peran masyarakat desa saat terjadi bencana tsunami” (“Tsunami! The story of what a village did when it was hit by a tsunami"), but USAid withdrew funding for the project prior to distribution. As a result, the booklets – which may have saved many lives – were not distributed before the tsunami hit.[v]

While the generosity of governments and citizens around the world in response to the tsunami is awe-inspiring, one of the greatest tragedies is that it takes an event of such magnitude to mobilise people. The vast majority of the world’s population are engaged in a constant struggle for survival – while it rarely makes the headlines, this is the disaster of everyday life. As noted in an editorial in the Washington Post;

…it's hard to avoid marvelling at the haphazard pattern of global empathy. Around the world, disasters that cut short hundreds of thousands of lives unfold constantly -- malaria kills 1 million people a year, AIDS kills about 3 million and the current genocide in Darfur has claimed perhaps 300,000 lives so far.[vi]

While commendable, our response to injustice must not be limited to the events that hit the front pages of our newspapers. We must acknowledge that disasters are neither ‘natural’ nor ‘Acts of God’, but are moulded partly by human hands – and that these hands can play a role in preventing and reducing them.

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[i] International Dalit Solidarity Network and National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights, Dalits Face Severe Discrimination in India's Tsunami Relief Efforts (Press Release) Copenhagen: January 11, 2005.

[ii] Talk of the Nation: Thai Buddhists Bury Tsunami Victims (Radio Program) NPR, Monday 3 January 2005. Available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4256861.

[iii] UNDP (2001) From Relief to Recovery: The Gujarat Experience. New York: United Nations Development Programme, Emergency Response Division.

[iv] LaTrobe, S (2004) Before Disaster Strikes. Available at http://www.bond.org.uk/networker/aug04/opinion.htm

[v] Johnston, S (2005) IDEP’s Tsunami Readiness Booklet. Available at http://spaces.msn.com/members/susijohnston/Blog/cns!1p9unOFWMVQ3UgLkL7kGIYDA!249.entry

Yayasan IDEP Foundation (2005)Yayasan IDEP’s Community Crisis Response Kit. Available at http://www.idepfoundation.org/idep_crisis_response.html

[vi] Washington Post (2005) Haphazard Charity, Tuesday 4 January 2005. Available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45947-2005Jan3.html